

AL-GHURABA



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FREE COUNTER-NARRATIVE MAGAZINE FOR 'THE PREVENTION' OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM OF JIHADISM ETIOLOGY'

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
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EDITORIAL

The journal, Al-Ghuraba of CISEG, is a tool of alternative narratives to prevent the violent radicalization of jihadist etiology and was born in August 2017 as a project of the Intelligence and Global Security Community. Al-Ghuraba is free, online, and monthly and aims to involve civil society in this sector and offer prevention and counter-terrorism tools in narrative to prevent violent radicalization within communities through accessible publications by analysts.

This problem is born in the communities, among people, and anyone can be in a situation of proximity with a radicalized profile or a radicalizing agent. As a result, providing tools for civil society enables them to be empowered, informed, and educated. On the other hand, it also serves to spread a counter-narrative in the face of this radicalization aimed at the most vulnerable groups to be radicalized. The objective is to create content that analyzes the current situation and manages to erode and delegitimize the discourses facilitated by these terrorist organizations.



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
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YIHAD, ¿QUÉ ES?

David Garriga Guitart

UNA GUÍA PARA ENTENDER QUÉ ES EL YIHADISMO.



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Title: Afghanistan: A Republic of Silence:

Memories of an Afghan student

Author: A.K

Editorial: Foca Ediciones y Distribuciones Generales

This book offers, through the eyes of those who have grown up overcoming obstacles and suffering in their flesh ethnic discrimination and the suffocating religious and feudal environment, a journey through the life journey of A. K. Thanks to him, the reader will be able to observe for the first time the life inside the madrasas, the Muslim religious schools, and know their rules, their privileges and their hierarchies. A plea in favour of human rights, dignity and equality between men and women, freedom and the value of secular education, and also a sincere criticism, without exaggeration, without hatred, of corruption, fanaticism and poverty. The testimony of this Afghan student and teacher not only transports us to a complex and difficult childhood and adulthood full of mixed feelings, material needs and Pashto domination, but also tells us about the collective evolution of those condemned to mutism. One of them has decided to do away with him. And this is a necessary, courageous act in a country where writing carries dangers for one's life.



The background of the entire image is a dark, muted blue-grey. In the center, there is a faded, light-colored world map. Overlaid on the map is a photograph of two hands shaking in a firm grip, symbolizing agreement or partnership. A semi-transparent, circular logo is centered over the handshake. The logo consists of several curved, leaf-like or petal-like shapes arranged in a circular pattern, creating a stylized emblem. Below the handshake, the text 'INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS' is written in a large, white, serif font, split across two lines. At the bottom, the website address 'WWW.ALGHURABA.ORG' is written in a smaller, white, sans-serif font, with spaces between the characters.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

W W W . A L G H U R A B A . O R G

THE FUTILITY OF THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

AND THE FRUSTRATED ATTEMPT TO RECONVERT THE STRATEGIC CURSE

Said Hamed WahdatAhmadzada.

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As is well known, the region in which Afghanistan lies is a tinderbox of constant conflicts and rivalries of regional actors and, without a doubt, of competing interests of major international actors. That is why, from distant times, but especially from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 21st century, everyone described the geographical situation of Afghanistan as a curse from which there was no escape and destiny that was impossible to change.

Since the middle of the 20th century, the position chosen by the Afghan authorities has always been influenced by political realities at the global level and subsequently at the regional level. During the monarchy and in the 1960s and until

the mid-1970s, during the First Republic, Afghanistan was identified with the code of non-alignment ¹. Subsequently, from the Soviet invasion in 1978 until the fall of the pro-Soviet regime of President Nayibulah, it practiced a geopolitical code of containment, aligned with the policies of the pro-Soviet bloc on a global level. In the 1990s, when there was a Mujahideen government and later the Taliban regime, the territory of Afghanistan had become a field of confrontation not for the great world powers, but for neighboring countries with opposing geopolitical codes and of armed groups with extremist tendencies, who chose to support different factions or proxies, according to their political or ideological affinities or interests.



At this time, after 20 years of international intervention and reconfiguration of the State in Afghanistan, it is regrettable to admit that, despite all the dedication and work for the development of regional cooperation, the creation of mechanisms to stimulate and increase trust between the States of the region, once again, Afghanistan stumbles on the same stone, the geopolitical curse to which it has been subjected throughout its history. However, in order to better understand the events and measures taken during the last two decades and also the patterns and perspectives of the countries of the region in this regard, it is necessary to describe the attempts that have been made to reconvert the geopolitical curse of Afghanistan.

Initiatives to reconvert the situation and promote a culture of cooperation, exchange and trust in the region.

After the international intervention in 2001, and the defeat of the Taliban movement, the Government's priority was to establish a politically inclusive, democratic, and transparent regime that was capable of maintaining peace and stability and modernizing the country's economy, and on the other hand, it had as The challenge is to reintegrate into regional and global mechanisms, develop bilateral relations and cooperation with States and regional and international actors, and also coordinate the fight against global terrorism and the threat it posed to the region. Gigantic tasks, for a country that was trying to get out of decades of armed conflict and violence.

In 2002, the government of Afghanistan, recognizing the vital importance of lasting peace and internal political-economic stability, being aware that to achieve its objectives it was necessary to maintain fluid relations in the region, it formulated a foreign policy that had as a priority the promotion of regional cooperation and integration and create a geopolitical code that at the local level will prioritize internal security and stability. At the regional level, the containment of the States of the region through the development of economic activities and the promotion of international cooperation, and at the global level, connecting



to (liberal) economic globalism for the development of a sustainable and self-sufficient economy. The government of Afghanistan aspired to three goals:

- Contain regional interventions through the promotion of regional cooperation with the purpose of greater internal stability.
- Use of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for regional cooperation that promote mutual trust among stakeholders and help carry out projects of mutual interest.
- Create greater interdependence among the States of the region through the creation of regional infrastructures.

In the domestic sphere, one of the first steps to take more into account the interests of the countries of the region was the inclusion of elements and political figures supported (proxies) in the formation of the new regime. A “Magic” formula to share the cake and thereby eliminate the existing discrepancies between different political and armed groups that, during the years of the “Jihad” against the Soviet Union, had constantly faced each other. This is how a fragile coalition government was created, politically unstable and manageable for any of the international actors, and above all a coalition that would lack stability and internal cohesion.

At the regional and international level, to implement this pragmatic vision, Afghanistan signed the Declaration of Good Neighborhood on December 22, 2002. The regional signatory states (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) expressed their desire for peace, stability in the region, and they shared their commitment to overthrow terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking. In addition, the signatories reaffirmed their commitment to constructive bilateral relations based on the principles of territorial integrity, mutual respect, friendly relations, cooperation, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. In addition, he participated very actively in the Bishkek Conference in 2004, the Kabul Conference in 2005, and the Delhi Conference

in 2006, all related to the development of regional cooperation and increased coordination in policies and matters of security, economy, and development.

This is how regional cooperation came to constitute one of the most important and priority pillars of the foreign policy of the Government of Afghanistan. In addition to the aforementioned initiatives, the government of Afghanistan took the following measures:

- In 2002 Afghanistan resumed its presence in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Afghanistan obtained membership status in 1992, but finally from 2002 it began to play a more active role in this organization.
- In 2003 it adhered to the Dubai Declaration on regional economic cooperation, which would be the basis of the so-called RECCA (Regional Economic Cooperation on Afghanistan). RECCA has aimed at promoting and developing regional economic interactions on Energy, Transportation Networks, Trade and Transit facilities, Communications, and Women's Economic Empowerment, in the region where Afghanistan is located.
- In 2005, Afghanistan became a member of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC).
- In 2007, during the 14th Summit of the South Asian Economic and Geopolitical Union (SAARC) held in Delhi, the Afghan government became the eighth member of this organization.
- In 2012, Afghanistan obtained the status of observer member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

In addition to being part of the existing organizations and mechanisms at the regional level, the government of Afghanistan took the initiative to create two platforms that would have this country as their axis and their objective was to increase coordination and transparency in matters of regional cooperation and also focus on measures that will fos-



–ter he confidence of the countries involved and in which they see their economic interests in the region reflected. These Initiatives were:

- - The Regional Conference on Economic Cooperation (RECCA) that for the first time took place in Kabul in 2005. This Conference has taken place in New Delhi in 2006, Islamabad 2009, Istanbul 2010, Dushanbe 2012, Kabul 2015, and Ashgabat 2017.
- On November 2, 2011, The “Heart of Asia Process” was founded in Istanbul Turkey, by 14 member states: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

This process also had the support of collaborating countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Finland, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

In addition, it had the support of the following regional and international organizations: The United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), The Agha Khan Foundation (AKDN), The Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Organization (CAREC) and the Bank of Asia Development (ADB), Conference (CICA), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), European Union (EU), NATO, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), OSCE, Association of South Asia Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The essential objective of this process was to strengthen and promote trust through sustained interactions and transactions in the region. This process had emerged to be a regional platform for coordinating cooperation on regional security, economic and political matters.

Adherence to these mechanisms served as platforms for the implementation of the policy of “Land Bridge” (Economic Corridor) that was aimed at the government of Afghan. But, beyond the creation of economic interdependence among the countries of the region and the inclusion of international actors as observer members or supporters of these mechanisms, the political intention was to create a fabric of interactions, a behavior, or better to say a culture of cooperation and exchange, non-existent in the region.

Guidelines or behaviors of Countries of the Region towards or around Afghanistan

RUSSIA: Russia's objectives in the Afghanistan environment and regional cooperation frameworks are multiple, but could be summarized as follows: exercise its strategic control over the Central Asian republics, strengthen its position in regional security institutions and increase its influence in the design of the Eurasia regional security environment. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its privileged physical access to Afghanistan. But despite this, it still intends to maintain its strategic influence in the region and exercise control over Afghanistan through the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. However, not all are manageable allies for Russia. More sophistication is needed to deal with countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as the former becomes increasingly inflexible towards Russia and the latter pursues neutrality as its official foreign policy course.



Russia aims to strengthen the position of regional security institutions of which it is a prominent member and therefore has greater influence on regional issues, such as the OSCE and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Its strategic objective is to ensure that these institutions have more influence in the design of the Eurasia regional security environment. Therefore, Russia is suspicious about the progress of regional initiatives, in which other players have the advantage of putting their own agenda forward. The implementation of projects such as the New Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt are not beneficial for Russia, as they seek to create alternative infrastructure and facilitate shipments of goods through routes that elude Moscow's control and influence. The success of these initiatives would strengthen the Central Asian countries along the new transport routes, turning them into transit countries and thus loosening Moscow's influence over them.

However, Russia has a record of openly supporting some projects started by other stakeholders, which do not correspond to its strategic objectives in the region. For example, in 2011 President Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia, expressed his support and pledged to contribute 500 million dollars for the realization of the CASA-1000 project aimed at providing electrical connection between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan via Afghanistan. Conventional logic suggests that the successful implementation of this initiative is not aligned with Moscow's main interests, as it will reduce the energy dependence of these post-Soviet countries on Russia; However, this contradiction can be explained as follows: the willingness to provide financial support for this type of project is justified on the basis of Russia's great interest in not being excluded from regional projects of great importance and in wanting to exercise greater control about them.

Moscow's goal of fostering Sino-Russian cooperation must be viewed through the lens of its strenuous relations with the West and the need to participate in China-led regional projects. Russia has to offset China's influence in Central Asia to preserve its strong position in the region, but it lacks the financial resources to achieve this goal. China has a lot to offer and exponentially expands cooperation with Central Asia through a series of economic projects, thus gaining more influence between these countries and facilitating Moscow's control over them. On May 8, 2015, Russia and China signed a joint declaration on cooperation to coordinate the development of the project of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) with the aim of combining these two projects (Carnegie, This shows that Russia has no choice but to concede to Chinese influence in the region, as it strives to remain part of the China-led initiatives.

On the other hand, Russia must combat drug trafficking and, above all, the spread of terrorism and extremism emanating from Afghanistan and Central Asia, threatening to transcend borders and cause severe headaches to Russia on its own soil. The Russian dilemma is the need to contain Afghanistan, to have a manageable and to some extent stable government, to prevent the spread of these threats, while at the same time being reluctant to invest in maintaining this security. Therefore, paradoxically, it needs greater participation of other powers capable of maintaining peace and stability in the region, so that Russia can follow its agenda in persuading the Central Asian countries, in a safe environment and, at the same time, offset the influence of these same powers.



CHINA: The need to secure its western borders and prevent Xinjiang province from becoming a safe haven for Islamic extremists and terrorist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. In addition, although he is not very shy or cautiously interested in getting directly involved in Afghanistan, to ensure that the conflict in the country does not affect the adjacent areas, for the development of his ONE BELT project, ONE ROAD.

Stability in Xinjiang also fits into Beijing's economic structure and development vision. As markets in China's traditionally upper coastal region become saturated and labor costs rise, its inland and western regions are being given more prominence. A shift of manufacturers inward with an abundance of cheap labor is an inevitable process if China is to maintain its economic momentum. It will also help address the problem of internal migration. In addition, the China-Kazakhstan and China-Turkmenistan gas pipelines run through the Xinjiang province, giving greater strategic importance to this region and making it even more convenient to adopt measures aimed at strengthening its security. Therefore, a contained, manageable, and to some extent, stable Afghanistan is important to maintain China's political-territorial stability and create conditions conducive to expanding its economic geography.

China also became clearly proactive in regional affairs around Afghanistan through increased engagement in regional cooperation mechanisms since 2014, especially after the signing of the Doha Agreement between the US and the Taliban movement in 2018. Recently, China began to widely promote its New Asian Security Concept based on the principles of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. This concept reflects China's vision towards security issues in the region and underscores its willingness and ability to be a leading actor in the design of regional security cooperation architecture. China also notably expanded its bilateral and cooperative relations with Pakistan, a country par excellence to resolve the situation in Afghanistan. The largest company among them is the megaproject of the economic corridor between China and Pa-





-kistan, whose cost is estimated at 46,000 million dollars. It is aimed at connecting the port of Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan to the province of Xinjiang.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA: The policies of Pakistan and India towards Afghanistan are derived from the nature of the relations between them. The strategic interests of Pakistan are of great importance in defining the fate of Afghanistan. Conventional thinking holds that the key to stability in Afghanistan is nowhere else but Islamabad. The porous and largely uncontrolled border called the Durand Line creates favorable conditions for infiltrations and regrouping of extremist fighters from both sides. Pakistan wants to maintain its exclusive influence over Afghanistan and fill the security vacuum after the military withdrawal of the US and its NATO allies, and the collapse of the Afghan government. Pakistan is totally against promoting the image of friendly India in Afghanistan and considers that an improvement in relations between the two states is harmful to its interests. India's main objective is to mitigate the threat of terrorism and extremism from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The strategic positions of India and Pakistan on the Afghanistan issue align the former with Iran and the latter with China on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other.

IRAN: Iran is a major player in regional affairs, with the ability to exert influence over Afghanistan. Linguistic affinity, the membership of 20 percent of Afghanistan's population to the Shiite branch of Islam, and the millions of Afghan refugees residing in Iran are among the most important cards that Iran can activate. Blocking the nuclear deal and increasing sanctions on Iran further contributed to his firmer policy on Afghanistan and the region.

Conclusion

The events of the last few months, culminating in August with the taking or handing over of the country to the Taliban movement, make us wonder if these regional mechanisms are of any use, the nature of which is to guarantee collaboration for greater stability in the region. Everything that has happened so far prompts us to ask ourselves devastating questions such as the following: Is it possible to promote regional cooperation through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms if the signatory member countries lack the independence and capacity to oppose major geopolitical games? It is feasible to have democratic or inclusive systems in a region where members do not respect the principle of non-interference and large players change their values as they please?

Undoubtedly, both the fragility and continued deterioration of the Afghan government and the lack of unity and political loyalty in Afghanistan have been among the major causes of the collapse of the regime. On the other hand, the external factor, the drastic change in the policies of international actors such as the US and other relevant countries, in coordination with the countries of the region, have driven an abrupt change in the political system in Afghanistan. A fragile, frail, and unsupported political system, where the old proxies were again activated and used to accelerate violent change.

This new scenario leaves millions of Afghans without a clear future, faced with stark and dark reality. The civilian population is now hostage to extremist and authoritarian forces. This may imply that we Afghans have failed, once again, when it comes to reconverting our geopolitical curse, but what about the international community? Now it is time to observe whether, after the supposed regional and international agreement to facilitate this change in my country, international society is capable of learning from the past and not limiting itself only to containing darkness and the extremist threat in a limited space.

A hand is holding a yellow crescent moon and star symbol over an open book. The book contains Arabic text, and the symbol is positioned over a specific passage. The background is a dark, blurred image of the book's pages.

SPIRITUALITY

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ISLAM OF THE TALIBAN

DECLARED ENEMY OF SPIRITUALITY AND SUFISM

Jordi Llaonart.

Arabist and journalist. Former press correspondent in the Middle East. Mtr. in Arab and Islamic World. Mtr. in Diplomacy and Foreign Action. Author of @arabislamblog



One of the reasons to explain the attitude of the Taliban towards life in general, and towards religion in particular, has a lot to do with their rejection of one of the main signs of human identity: spirituality. A society that lives faith and religion stripped of all mysticism and that reduces these two phenomena to a simple dress code and a list of punishments has to become, by force, in a society less empathetic, less flexible and, to a certain extent point, bearer of the seed of self-destruction.

Spirit beings by nature

300,000 years ago, at the moment when Homo Erectus

became Homo Sapiens thanks to the exceptional development of his brain, the new human being gained an unprecedented ability in the animal world: the capacity for abstraction. Since then, he has been able to think, visualize and discuss things without having to face them.

The capacity for abstraction generated new questions and uncertainties related to the origin of life, the causes of disease, death, and fortune. Thus, since man is a man, he has expressed his concerns through traditions, rituals, myths, and legends. Over time, the development of societies brought with it the institutionalization of what we know today as religion.



Religion is a practice and an institution. It is a faith and an adherence to a tradition that is expressed in two twin areas, inseparable and indistinguishable: through a liturgy organized by clergymen or imams and, also, through atavistic customs, fears, hopes and dreams that are externalized to through more or less informal popular rites.

The spiritual path of Sufism

Throughout history, some believers have delved into the mystical path. That is, they have approached the sacred beyond what the institution offered, as well as the existing expressions of popular religiosity. In the Islamic context, people who explore the path of mysticism in a group and with the help of a sheik make up what we know as Sufi brotherhoods or tariqas.

Sometimes, the Sufis describe the sheikh or teacher as a mirror that allows the initiate to contemplate his own interior and helps him to awaken the inner faculties to be able to witness the sacred. In fact, Sufism is an experience that takes place within each of its members.

Since Sufism is a teaching based on practice and not on texts, it consists of a whole series of initiation rituals in which poetry, music, and dance are very present. All of them disciplines that are capable of expressing feelings that can hardly be described by words. The experiential character of Sufism, far from the literality of the texts, and which tries to overcome the limitations of the human condition to reach the knowledge of the truth implies that, unlike other Islamic religious traditions, it incorporates a universal message.

The enemies of spirituality in Islam

Since the dawn of time, the spirituality that permeates institutional and popular religiosity has been an integral part of the human being. In the Islamic context, the three spheres: institutional religion, popular religiosity and Sufi tariqas, have always coexisted. In other words, Islamic culture has been, throughout the lands of Islam, the sum of Islamic law, the mo-

-sque, the amulets, the visits to the tombs of the holy men, and the practices of the mystics.

In spite of everything, throughout history, there have been currents of thought that have stripped man of the spiritual facet of him and have fought with special harshness the expressions of popular religiosity. At the very least, they have tried.

One of these currents is known as Salafism and advocates the abandonment and combat of any tradition that is not included in the Koran or the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad. One of the main characteristics of the Salafists is that they believe in the literalness of the Qur'an. All Muslims believe that the Qur'an is the word revealed by God to Muhammad. But most schools believe that some of its expressions should be interpreted beyond the literal sense of the word. For example, when the Qur'an speaks of the "face of God", or what he does with "his hands".

Instead, Salafists accept the entire revealed word literally and do not stop to think or discuss how the Qur'an can say that God has hands. They accept it as is, without considering why. They believe that the efforts of intellectuals to elaborate explanations are a waste of time. Salafists also prioritize appearance over experience because of their concept of faith. For the majority of Islamic currents, faith is the conviction that one has to be Muslim and believe in revelation. In other words, you have it, or you don't have it. Instead, Salafists believe that faith is that which exists in the heart, which is expressed in language, and which is practiced through actions. Therefore, it can increase or decrease. In other words, talking about it and expressing it in actions makes you, in some way, "more Muslim".

In short, Salafism is a literal current, based on the text and that, in addition, gives preeminence to the outside and the appearance over the interior and the spiritual experience. That is why his vision of Islam clashes head-on with the views of the Sufis and a good part of the religious tradition.





The Taliban movement is one of the crudest expressions of this current that, in general, had played a secondary role in Islamic society. This was the case until a series of political events that, in principle, had little to do with religion, gave wings to this line of thought until it became the dominant one in some countries such as Afghanistan.

Wahhabism, Muslim Brothers and Deobandis

The events to which we refer took place in three corners of the Islamic world simultaneously, or within a few years of each other, and are related to the doubts and insecurities generated by the fall of myths and borders, and the traumatic entry of a full of Muslims in a globalized world subjected to the West.

The first is the coming to power of the Wahhabis in Arabia and the transformation of the Saudi kingdom into an oil power with the economic capacity to spread their message. The history of the alliance of the Wahhabis and the Al Saúd family is well known, and that their accession to power extended their particular vision of Islam to practically the entire Peninsula. The ideologue of the movement, Abd al-Wahhab, was heir to the theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who in the s. XIII advocated the abandonment and combat of any tradition that was not included in the Koran or the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad. Both were declared enemies of Sufism and of some expressions of religiosity and popular cultures, such as visiting the tombs of illustrious sheiks and music.

The second milestone is the Islamic reform movement that emerged as a result of European colonization. With the French occupation of Algeria in 1830 and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, for the first time since the emergence of Islam, a non-Islamic government took control and ruled the destiny of Islamic territories and their population.

This situation generated concern and an identity crisis among the intellectuals, who developed a whole theory about the path that the Islamic community should take to recover from this new situation. Some opted to imitate European power, while the majority studied how to adapt the modernity that came from the West to Islam. This movement, known as Islamic reformism and in which Sayyid Qutb, another follower of Ibn Taymiyya stands out, is the embryo of groups founded a few decades later, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

The third moment corresponds to the fall of the Mughal Empire and the British occupation of India. In 1858 the United Kingdom turned the Indian subcontinent into a colony, ending three centuries of an Islamic state that had been controlled by a Muslim elite that, with the arrival of the British, changed from sovereign to serf. In this new environment of uncertainty, a current called deobandi developed that urged Muslims to abandon the traditions that united them with the Hindus and advocated a return to Islam as they considered it to be practiced in the time of Muhammad, in the s.VII.

The new political Islam: the merger of the three schools

A century later, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani government financed the creation of religious schools to welcome and indoctrinate in the Deobandi faith the thousands of young Afghan refugees who had fled their country because of the war. The Islamabad regime, eager to stabilize the neighboring country and bring its allies to power, drafted students from the many Deobandi schools scattered throughout the Pashtun region on its side of the border. These boys had grown up in boarding schools and had been educated away from their families and without contact with any woman. This stu-



-dent body or Taliban, funded by Saudi Arabia and organized, armed, and led by Pakistan, seized power over much of Afghanistan in 1996.

At this time and place, the three branches of Islam converge, cornering and fighting expressions of popular religiosity and Sufism and all that it entails. In Afghanistan, numerous leaders and thousands of followers of the three doctrines coincide physically and know each other personally: Wahhabi, Reform, and Deobandi.

The friendship and relationship they established during those years continued to live once the bulk of the troops returned to their countries of origin. Many of them participated in the indiscriminate attacks and wars that dotted the region in the 1990s.

The extreme violence of these combatants doomed their struggle to failure, as the peoples they wanted to liberate turned their backs on them. But one thing is clear. Muslims massively rejected the extreme violence of Afghan veterans. However, the rejection of his ideas was not so unanimous. This has allowed the new ideology of terror, this very particular reading of what Islam should be, this fusion of three extremist and exclusive traditions, has been able to sow its seed in the four corners of the Islamic world.





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GEOSTRATEGY

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TALIBAN

INSURGENTS OR TERRORISTS?

Manuel Robledo.

Marine Corps Officer and Intelligence Analyst.



Both during the preparation and during the subsequent deployment on Afghan land, our perception of the Taliban (in Pashtun language: students) was that we were facing an insurgency, whose core was made up of peasants and students of Islam from Afghan and Pakistani religious schools, they were seen as a movement opposed to any foreign presence. The essentially terrorist actor was Al-Qaeda, protected by the Taliban. Among the tactics of the former did not include Suicide bombings, nor even the pure and harsh attack, combat was expected of them, assuming that the terrorist tactics were applied by AQ.

The origin

The Taliban movement was created in the early 90s in full Pashtun fief (Kandahar) following the departure of the Soviet Union. Sunni nationalist and Islamist nature, they defend the supremacy of the Pashtun ethnic group beyond Afghanistan. They had control of Afghanistan from 96 to 2001, when they were defeated and expelled from power, and then formed an insurgent force with a strong terrorist drift. Turning again to the perception on the ground, and always from the point of view acquired in a COP (Combat out post) in a rural area like



Ludina, the Taliban was and was not, you could not identify it, but people lived by their rules, and if they didn't, they suffered the consequences. Their ranks were fed by people who were temporarily joining them, the one who was a baker on Monday could be the Taliban on Tuesday and return to the bakery on Wednesday.

Today they have regained power, and we are witnessing a whitening of their procedures, we hear about insurgency and terrorism as opposing terms, the purpose of these lines is to try to locate these terms.

Obviously, now that they are in power, they cannot be considered insurgents. The pact made by Trump and materialized by Biden made effective this 2021 a Taliban government in Afghanistan, entered with their already known methods, the radical Islamist law, the Sharia, has fundamental weight in family domestic life and religious judges have the power to decide domestic and property disputes. They may impose the death penalty on women or men simply for dancing, singing, laughing, or for making contact with each other. While they seek to make their methods less public in order to gain international recognition, there is no indication of secularization of their normative system.

Terrorists or insurgents?

The FBI website considers international terrorism to be Violent criminal acts committed by individuals or groups inspired or associated with foreign terrorist organizations or nations. It involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of any State.

The definition covers acts aimed at intimidating or coercing the civilian population, influencing the policy of a government through intimidation or coercion, affecting the conduct of a Government through mass destruction, murder or abduction.

The same website considers Domestic Terrorism to be violent criminal acts committed by individuals or groups to promote ideological objectives derived from domestic influences of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature. It involves acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of any State.

The UN General Assembly describes terrorism as criminal acts aimed at provoking a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or individuals in particular, for political purposes, in any unjustifiable circumstances, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature.

The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism adopted the following definition; any act or threat of violence, whatever its purposes, that occurs in advancing an individual or collective criminal agenda, seeking to sow panic among people, harming or endangering their life, liberty, or safety, or seeking to cause harm to, occupy or seize the environment or public and private facilities, or seeking to endanger national resources.

Definition of insurgency

The term insurgency is identified with irregular, guerrilla, unconventional warfare, and even terrorist warfare. Insurgents can employ guerrilla and terrorist tactics and pose asymmetric threats to conventional forces. It can be deduced that the term may encompass terrorism, but not necessarily the other way around.

The US Department of Defense defines insurgency as an organized movement aimed at overthrowing a constituted government, through the use of subversion and armed conflict. We speak of prolonged violence in a conflict in which they seek to change the politics or social order of a state or region through the use of violence, subversion, social rupture, and political action. Normally, the presence of government forces will last a week to verify the area and then the units will



return to their detachment, leaving the town again in the hands of the insurgents, who have time to live with the population.

The insurgency is primarily a struggle in which both sides use armed force to create space for their policies. Insurgents seek to gain control of the population through a combination of persuasion, subversion, and coercion while using guerrilla tactics to counter government forces. Their intention is often to prolong the struggle, exhaust the government, and gain enough popular support to force capitulation or political accommodation.

To finance their activities, insurgents often foster an illicit economy, sometimes international in scope, by evading government control and taxation. If other countries support the affected government, insurgents tend to target the public there directly, pressuring them to cease their assistance. Such pressure can be exerted through actions of deterrence from the public opinion of origin. Alternatively, a more direct effect can be achieved through terrorist attacks launched within the country itself.

Conclusion

During their five years in power, the Taliban applied a strict version of sharia law. Women were prohibited from working or studying, confined to their homes unless accompanied by a male guardian. Public executions and flogging, Western films and books were prohibited, and cultural artifacts considered blasphemous under Islam were destroyed. Opponents and Western countries today accuse the Taliban of wanting to return to this style of government, a claim the group denies. The Taliban said earlier this year that they wanted a "genuine Islamic system" for Afghanistan that would provide for the rights of women and minorities, in line with cultural traditions and religious norms. However, there are indications that the group has already begun to ban women from working in some areas.

From all the above, it can be said that the Taliban who fought these years from their hiding places constituted an insurgency that did not rule out terrorist actions, especially in certain areas where they acted in collusion with Al-Qaeda. It follows from the definitions here that insurgency and terrorism are not antagonistic terms, but that terrorism is a tactic and insurgency a form of armed opposition, and the Taliban fit into both definitions.

This clarifies to some extent that it was the Taliban who were aspiring to power, but it also makes clear their role after the takeover, the application of a law that terrorizes the people, oppresses them, and deprives them of their most fundamental rights, which rejects democracy as almost illegal and which, for that reason, will never seek any other legitimacy than divine law and alleged international recognition, makes the Taliban unquestionably active subjects of State terrorism.





TERRORISM

W W W . A L G H U R A B A . O R G

TERRORIST GROUPS OF JIHADIST ETIOLOGY IN AFGHANISTAN

Jordi Escofet.

Jihadist etiology terrorism analyst. CISEG Collaborator.



This document is intended as a very general bath of the terrorist groups of jihadist etiology that since the 70s have been present and have a real weight within the Afghan conflict. These have also been chosen because they are the most important and decisive today. For this reason, this text should be understood as an opinion document that reflects in a very light way the appearance and rise of all terrorist groups to reach the final conclusion of a possible scenario in the short and medium term.

All and that resistance, the jihadist movements in Afghanistan are nothing new. In 1969, a group of young students from the Kabul faculty founded the Islamic Party of

Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan), as an Islamist alternative against the Marxist movements that prevailed in the university and that penetrated the new Afghan youth.

These secular movements were located in the university until Gulbuddin Hekmatyar brought together his former members and colleagues, who from the beginning and in many cases from underground and exile, were reorganized so that in 1975 the HEZB-E-ISLAMI group, which was an Islamist party, based on the structure and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and of an anti-communist and anti-Marxist court.



Within its structure, there were two very separate branches, the political and the paramilitary with a main effort: the fight against Western interference to face the new threats that were looming on the horizon, one of them, to change the current government for one based on Islamic law, the Sharia.

During the year 1979, a Gulbuddin deputy, Mulavi Younas JALIS decides to carry out the Jihad on his own and creates a division called HEZB-E-ISLAM JALIS, his area of action being the same as the original group, eastern Afghanistan, and more. Specifically, the Nangarhar area, Kunar, and the border tribal areas.

After this split, the original group called HEZB-E-ISLAM was renamed HEZB-E-ISLAM GULBUDDIN in honor of its creator, and HEZB-E-ISLAM JALIS adopting the name of the lieutenant who had decided to undertake his own objective, which would be none other than to expand the Jihad through its areas of influence and interest, becoming part of the "seven of Peshawar", where one of its mujahidin commanders was an unknown Jalaluddin Haqqani, lord of the war against the invader Soviet.

Initially, the HAQQANI NETWORK was a Sunni Islamist militant organization that during the 80s was very present in the creation of Al Qaeda, providing intellectual and material support, even being recognized as a member of the utmost importance for the organization, since in the decade of in the 1980s, Haqqani's Mujahideen army recruited foreign fighters, among them Osama Bin Laden is said to have been a major sponsor. This was impregnated by the great military capacity of Haqqani, the latter being the one who was always present in every need of AQ to be able to continue with his objective of GLOBAL YIHAD, an action that Haqqani did not share because he was more focused on a local influence over Afghanistan. With the victory of the Taliban, he swore allegiance in 1995 and to date is a great logistical-financial support for the terrorist organization, occupying positions of political relevance.

In 2012 the HAQQANI NETWORK was included in the or-



ganizations defined as terrorists by the United States and in 2015 the Government of Pakistan did the same. Currently, its leader is Sarajuddin Haqqani and in 2015 its alliance with the Taliban was much stronger and its terrorist activity hardened, being considered the most lethal terrorist group and with the most cutting-edge means with which the troops of the coalition, leading to the use of complex attacks as a mark of identity. These two terrorist groups began their operations in a very isolated way, fighting for their areas of interest without having a major influence outside them. Individually they were strong but due to the difference of tribes and ethnic groups, they did not finish that agglutination to get the Afghan Emirate.

In the early 1990s, the Taliban movement emerged, a Deobandi Islamist political-religious movement and military organization supplemented by the pro-Pashtun Hanafi school and its first and most charismatic leader was Mullah Mohammed Omar. It was initially made up of local farmers and students from the Afghan and Pakistani madrasas. Since 1994, the Taliban presence has been expanding from the south and conquering the provinces that it found in its path, being its peak and coming to power from 1996 after the taking of Kabul, when the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was established until 2001. Moment in which the international coalition led by the United States army invaded the country to carry out the fight against terror, where AQ and the Taliban were in the focus of action due to the attack suffered by Osama Bin Laden in the Fateful September 11, 2001. After the death of Mullah Omar in 2013, his second-in-command, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansur, the organization's second Taliban leader, was elevated to the rank of leader, who is currently in power and is the architect of the Doha negotiations. Considered as the most active and deadly terrorist organization, they have carried out all kinds of attacks against the international coalition and the Afghan government, approaching guerrilla warfare and asymmetric combat and war in the gray zone as a daily fact magnifying its scope and depth.

In 2007, during that Taliban hegemony, Baitullah Mehsud

made an appearance with his new terrorist group, the TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP), or the commonly called Taliban of Pakistan. This group was born to combat the presence of the Pakistani regime that was occupying the tribal areas to implement the Sharia and expel the troops of the international coalition. To this end, they have not hesitated to maintain a high level of contact with AQ and the Taliban, using the HAQQANI NETWORK to obtain funds in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Currently, the group is led by Noor Wali Mehsud, who had initial contact meetings with IS-KP and went on to expand its armed wing until the Syrian war.

All these terrorist groups have had a common ally, this ally has been Al-Qaeda, which with its transnational ambition has been able to take advantage of the experience of Insurgent leaders fight to train new terrorists in Taliban training camps. Therefore, from a young Mullah Omar, Haqqani to the current leaders, they have known how to pay homage in a less pompous way to avoid being within the radars of Western intelligence services and to be able to remain active, although sometimes with a low profile, to be able to survive and know how to wait for the moment. For this reason, the appearance of Daesh in 2014, as a radical split from AQ, gave him a balloon of oxygen, and he was able to stay away from the focus of interest until the Caliphate fell and the Caliph's gaze was towards the Afghan lands, where the population and the situation were apparently favorable to them. In 2015, former TTP members, including former commanders such as Hafiz Saeed Khan, swore allegiance to Daesh and formed a new terrorist franchise in Khorasan that was called IS-KP (Islamic State in Khorasan Province). For this, they aligned themselves with smaller groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangui al-Alani, Lashkar-e-Islam and Jamat-ul-Ahrar. It is estimated that their presence is no greater than 3,500 fighters, and that these are concentrated in the peripheral districts of Kabul and on the eastern border with Pakistan.

Since the Doha pacts, the IS-KP has kept a low profile and awaiting favorable events since, within their idea of expanding the Caliphate in Afghanistan, they clash with the local population. For this reason, they want to maintain an



open a corridor in eastern Afghanistan to be able to source militants from Southeast Asia where Daesh affiliates are still active, in addition to exploiting radicalization and online recruitment to target a new generation of younger terrorists. From 2015 to 2021, the IS-KP has lost six leaders and more than 500 middle managers, its current leader being an Iraqi named Shahab Al-Muhajir, a recognized expert on guerrilla warfare in the urban environment and behind the most attacks lethal terrorist group. As can be seen, a lot of military and terrorist pressure has been applied to the young terrorist group to prevent this actor from settling in the area, Daesh being a terrorist group little tolerated by the Afghan population and the Taliban. In addition, AQ has helped the IS-KP faction have many problems to have a quiet presence in the area as they fight for different concepts, some focused on the Global Jihad of "true Muslims" (IS-KP) and the rest in a "local" Jihad within the Afghan scene and the creation of the Afghan Emirate against that of the Afghan Caliphate.

Conclusion

The initial agglutination of the entire terrorist network on the Afghan scene was AQ until the Taliban power and influence, thanks to its territorial and non-globalist identity, allowed the balance to turn towards them, granting them the first Taliban government (1996-2001), becoming, after the fall due to the invasion of the international coalition troops, an insurgency. An insurgency that for 20 years has been the one that has carried the burden of terrorism on Afghan soil, attacking without quarter all coalition troops, members of the ANA and ANP, state officials, and everything that was under the Western umbrella. For this reason, that hegemony had become an excellent war machine and above all, a detail that might have gone unnoticed, the Taliban intelligence network had and has hardly anything to envy of any Western power.

For this reason, and especially since the Doha treaty was signed, its low-profile diplomatic machinery has been working in all sectors of the Afghan administration; from the high political class, through the elderly warlords, and down to the last ANA soldier. Knowing that this situation was favorable to them, they carried out a military operation worthy of study in the military academies, retaking control of the country in less than 15 days, emulating the well-known Blitzkrieg (lightning war) so famous.

The only setback that may appear in order to establish a "quiet" Emirate is the presence of IS-KP, then hyperbole could be observed, since the Taliban insurgents, now in a "legitimate" government, would have to fight against the IS-KP insurgency. It is possible that some other nearby power will be in charge of doing the dirty work for the Taliban and will end up attacking IS-KP from all possible fronts applying the tactics of the Western special forces together with the air support, so necessary and effective in that stage. As actions in the medium term, the Taliban will finish conquering the Panjshir valley to be able to say that it rules over the entire territory and possibly will try to expand its tentacles using tribal diplomacy in Pakistan and India, where the deobandi movement is quite present and occupies a place outstanding. For this reason, it is expected that terrorism of jihadist etiology will be persistent in the area, with the destabilization of some border power as a milestone. It is very likely that what happened in Afghanistan will be transferred to the Sahel and AQ will know how to take advantage of what happened and above all what it has learned to design a much more local terrorism, to win over the population even more and in the long run it can be adapted or hidden from the transnational.

Finally, and as a personal reflection of someone who has stepped on that particular scenario, I can only say that the concept of training or mentoring societies and armies that are not within our way of thinking and understanding modern warfare should be examined. What happened in Afghanistan has been that spark that should make us redesign that concept to adapt it to what each country or each area needs to mentor.

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




TERRORISMO

'TERRORISMO YIHADISTA'

UNA AMENAZA EXTERNA



ALEJANDRO GABRIEL CASSAGLIA

CÓMPRALO EN AMAZON

¡Haz clic aquí!

A person wearing a hard hat and safety glasses is working on a server rack. The background is a dark, blue-toned image of a server room with many cables. A semi-transparent city skyline is overlaid on the image. The word "INTELLIGENCE" is written in large, white, serif capital letters at the bottom.

INTELLIGENCE

W W W . A L G H U R A B A . O R G

THE TALIBAN

TERRORISTS OR CRIMINALS

Alejandro Cassaglia.

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In 1999, the United Nations Security Council, through Resolution 1267, established the Committee named after the number of the resolution. And from there, they begin to compile the lists of terrorists and terrorist suspects, among which stand out the members of the Global Terrorist Network, Al-Qaeda (The Base), and the leaders of the Taliban regime that ruled in Afghanistan, from 1996. This resolution was the consequence of the criminal terrorist attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2001, and after the terrorist attacks on US soil, and the refusal of the Taliban regime to hand over Usama bin Laden, they are considered enemies of the West, and there the invasion of the O.T.A.N.'s troops to Afghanistan are resolved. At that time, no one would

Have dared to contradict the United States about both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban being considered terrorist groups.

The Taliban, cornered by North Atlantic Organization troops, have to flee Kabul and the major cities, taking refuge in the mountainous north of the country, and also in Pakistan. But it is here that the issues begin to become blurred, in relation to whether the Taliban were still a terrorist group or had become a criminal organization. This is because they are aimed at increasing poppy cultivation, and the resulting heroin trafficking. But the interests of the West were changing, the death of Bin Laden on May 2, 2011, and the economic and death toll, on the part of the United States and its allies, will result in the political decision, on the part of the



new American president, Joe Biden, of withdrawing the troops from Afghan soil, although military intelligence and the generalate, advised him otherwise. That's where we saw heartbreaking images of Afghans, who had collaborated with Western troops, who were watching for their tragic fate. An untimely departure of the troops, and the consequent abandonment of those who had hitherto been their allies.

The Afghan army, formed, armed, and trained by the United States, was immediately disbanded. The Northern Alliance, whose leader is the son of the assassinated General Massoud, resulted in the blood alliance between the Taliban and bin Laden (who coordinated his assassination by using two "shahid" with explosive vests) whose "favor" It earned the leader of al-Qaeda not to be handed over to the Americans. This alliance still fights in the Panjshir Valley, but that is not able to confront the Taliban, who have been strengthened with all the weaponry they "inherited" by the abandonment of the Americans in their hasty flight.

Against this backdrop, it was logical to think that the Taliban would again take political control of Afghanistan. Regime that was no longer considered a terrorist group by the United States, despite the existence of the aforementioned Resolution 1267.

From that moment on, and despite the promises of moderation, by the tribal leaders who formed the new Afghan government, reprisals, persecution, executions, and all kinds of human rights violations began, which had already been seen during his government between 1996 and 2001. What could make you think that these same characters who had committed all kinds of atrocities would change and moderate themselves. It was a serious miscalculation. Once again, the lack of knowledge of the culture of a people of the East would cause suffering to a population that seems to be doomed to terror.

It is at this moment that, counting only a handful of correspondents from some Western media, and with only knowledge of what is happening in the country's capital, Ka-

-bul, without having information about what is happening in the rest of the country, all kinds of "pseudo experts" began to give totally erroneous opinions. Qualifying the Taliban as Salafists, followers of the Hanbali school of legal interpretation, applicators of "Sharia" or Islamic Law, and other opinions, erroneous, more.

In order to bring clarity to the situation, first of all, to mention that Afghanistan does not belong to the area called the Middle East or the Middle East. This country is located in the region called Central Asia. It is a multicultural and multi-tribal country, with approximately 45 percent of the population being Pashtun (and not Arab as some may misrepresent), the remainder being Uzbek, Tajik, and 9 percent belonging to the minority branch of Islam, Shia. They have begun to be persecuted and, consequently, involuntary emigration to the Iranian border. Although they use the Arabic alphabet, they speak Pashtun. Culturally they identify and swear allegiance to their clan and not to the Afghan state.

Continuing with the clarification of erroneous interpretations. In Afghanistan the school of jurisprudential interpretation, Islamic, is not the Hanbali, but the Hanafi, with which they could never be Salafists. Although the former has had some influence in recent times, through the Wahhabi ideology, coming from Saudi Arabia, and due to the presence of bin Laden in the region. They are details that are only known when the real experts delve into these little-known topics. On the other hand, while they apply the "sharia", they do not do so in the same way as the followers of the DAISH (ISIS for West), since they are influenced by the "pashtunwali", which consists of a code of conduct, not written, that they practice for 3 thousand years.

Another issue, to keep in mind, is that it is among the 5 poorest countries in the world, however, it has natural resources that are attractive to regional powers, which has produced that China (who already had companies exploiting resources in the country through the Company "China Metallurgical Group Corporation") was presented as a kind of "protector" to the world. The Chinese government knows that

by giving political and economic support to the new Taliban government, it is ensuring to regain its support through the exploitation of its resources. Protagonism that is in dispute with the interests of Russia. Afghanistan has significant oil reserves (estimated at between 500 and 2 billion barrels of crude oil). It also possesses important reserves of gas and coal. To this, we add the mineral resources. It has emeralds, Laspizlázuli, precious metals such as gold and silver, as well as copper, beryllium, chromium, and zinc. It also has uranium. And it also has Lithium (so important for the Chinese telephone industry, since it is used for the manufacture of batteries for cell phones).

We cannot fail to mention the presence of ISIS-K, that is, the branch of the Islamic State in the Korassian area, which has already carried out executions and terrorist attacks, which are at odds with the interests and objectives of al-Qaeda, and thus with their blood allies, the Taliban. The most important attack we have seen during the evacuation of US troops, carrying out two bombings, one in the vicinity of Kabul airport, and the other in a hotel where Marine Corps members were staying, where there were about 12 soldiers killed in this action. There is no doubt about the involvement of this terrorist group, as they themselves have taken responsibility for attributing them. In recent days they carried out another attack on a mosque of the Shiite branch, with the result of some thirty deaths.

Finally, I would like to refer to the title of the article. The Taliban are terrorists or criminals. In principle, we mention that the methodology of terror is used by both terrorist groups and transnational organized crime. The mode of financing for both groups is similar. Here we have the Taliban using the policy of terror to achieve their goals, and they are financed by the proceeds of heroin trafficking. In principle, nothing would differentiate them from a criminal organization. The border between the two activities is very blurred, however when analyzing the objectives of both groups, there we find the difference. While criminal organizations target the economic, using terrorist methods, but to achieve their goal, while terrorists target the political,

financing themselves with criminal activities. Therefore, we can conclude, in my humble way of thinking, that the Taliban are a terrorist group, whose main objective is the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, relying on religious and cultural issues, and financing itself with drug trafficking.

In relation to how the situation in Afghanistan will evolve, with the Taliban government, it will only be enough to look at what happened between 1996 and 2001, when they ruled the country.



REFUGEES FROM AFGHANISTAN 2.0

BIOMETRIC DATA, HYBRID CONFLICT AND AVERSION TO REFUGEES IN EUROPE

Óscar Ruiz.

Marine Corps, NATO Headquarters, Belgium



Introduction

With the end in Afghanistan of the first “Forever War” against terror, came the result that we all feared with the return to power of the Taliban, their strict Islamic or Sharia law, and with it the loss of all advances in economics and humans rights that had been achieved in the last 20 years. All illusions of freedom and progress in Afghanistan ended on August 15, with the Taliban taking Kabul.

One of the most important questions the world asks after this Taliban “reconquest” is whether there will be a “refugee crisis” similar to the one that took place in 2015 when the democratic foundations of the European Union shook with t

the arrival of more 1.3 million irregular migrants to Europe, mainly due to the war in Syria, but also due to the levels of terrorism and insecurity that were taking place at that time in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

In the dreaded “cascade of events” that could occur in Afghanistan once the Taliban took Kabul and that would begin with the economic collapse leading to a civil war later on, the refugee crisis would be a very important vector to take into account because it would mean, among other things, that either the levels of violence have increased considerably, or the country is going through a severe economic crisis (or collapse), and either of these two options would bring us dangerously close to the aforementioned war between Afgh-



-ans. In addition to this, the main host countries for Afghan refugees, Pakistan and Iran, which have already been bearing a significant refugee burden for years, could be destabilized, especially bearing in mind that Pakistan is a nuclear power, with a “supervised” democracy for military, no one wants to see a socially unstable Pakistan.


In the case of Turkey, the situation could be overwhelmed and socially “exploited”, as happened on September 8, when there were important demonstrations against Syrian refugees living in the country, and the possible increase in Afghan asylum seekers due to the conflict that is being lived there. The already discontented Turkish population would not only not support Erdogan to receive more refugees, but, under social pressure, they could consider renegotiating with the EU the situation of the approximately 3.7 million Syrians that they already have in their country after the agreement that the Turks signed with the European Union in 2016 to welcome millions of migrants and not allow them free passage to Europe. To avoid a wave of Afghan migrants on its borders, Turkey, where there are already 116,000 [1] registered refugees, although the figure of 120,000 unregistered is also given, continues to build a 3-meter-high [2] concrete fence (similar to the one already built on its border with Syria) on its border with Iran, of which at the end of this year they intend to have completed 64 of the 295 kilometers of border that the two countries share, and which according to government sources, they are willing to complete. Turkey, in addition to being a very desirable destination for Afghan refugees, also means the path to Europe.

Situational point. Economic crisis, climate change and COVID-19

Afghanistan is one of the countries that produce the largest number of refugees in the world, being the current (official) situation according to UNHCR sources that we can see in this graph:

Neighbouring countries took in the highest number of Afghans in 2020

Countries with the most Afghan refugees and asylum seekers



Source: UNHCR data for 2020

BBC

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In addition to this official information, one must take into account the hundreds of thousands of Afghans who are abroad and are not legally recognized as refugees or asylum seekers. Parallel to these data, the United Nations assures that there are currently 3.5 million [3] internally displaced persons in Afghanistan, taking into account that only in this year 2021 more than 500,000 new displaced persons have been added (of this figure, 80% are women and girls), of which 126,000 occurred in the Taliban's advance towards Kabul between 7 July and 9 August 2021.

All this in a country that before the Taliban offensive was already dealing with a humanitarian crisis in which, in addition to the half million newly displaced, 800,000 Afghan refugees had returned from Iran and Pakistan, and 14 million inhabitants (35% of the population) were hungry or in dire need of food [4]. In addition to typical factors that drive the search for international refuge, such as the economic crisis and the levels of violence in the country, 20 years of Western rule have been enough to create in Afghanistan an immense network of Afghan collaborators linked to political and diplomatic foreign offices, companies, NGOs, and US and NATO armies, that if we also add vulnerable populations to Taliban rule (girls, women, journalists, translators, Hazaras ... the 130,000 [5] citizens who have been rescued from the country would be far exceeded this past summer, resulting in a future refugee surplus of at least hundreds of thousands of Afghans.

Current economic crisis

Afghanistan is currently suffering from a humanitarian crisis, in which humanitarian aid donor countries have reduced the funds they provided to the country by 75% compared to the previous government, and a serious economic crisis in which liquid money is running out, ending up.

One of the main causes of the lack of liquidity in the country would be the between 7,000 and 9,000 million dollars of foreign reserves from Afghanistan that the United States kee-

-ps frozen in its banks, and that would remain held longer in this situation because the United States [6]:

- He could be using it to influence Afghanistan, using this money as a measure of pressure to try to control the conduct (maximum possible respect for human rights, especially of girls and women) of the Taliban government.
- The Americans have not recognized the Taliban government, moreover, they consider it a terrorist organization (specifically the TTP or Taliban of Pakistan and the Haqqani Network), therefore, releasing the funds could not be legally sustained.
- The USA fears that even if it released the money, it would not be used to alleviate the humanitarian crisis or to improve the situation of the country's economy.

In this situation, the US is faced with the situation of either freeing up the money and "helping the Taliban economically", or continuing with the money frozen and continuing to be one of the causes of the serious economic crisis.

Climate change and COVID-19

The IPCC (Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Climate Change) has declared that in the coming decades climatic conditions could radically affect the living conditions of some vulnerable countries, including Afghanistan [7].

It seems clear that climate change will act as a "multiplying force" of the problems of the weaker states such as social tensions, poverty, weak political institutions... [8] and Afghanistan is a perfect example of this situation where you can see how they are already affecting these changes to their agriculture, whether in the form of continuous drought or seasonal floods, increasingly inflict serious food problems in the country.

As in the rest of the planet and due to the characteristics of climate change (which begins to produce internally displaced

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- Biometric technology for migration control.
- The use of refugees as a political and destabilizing weapon (Hybrid conflict),
- Europe's fear of a new wave of migrants or (complete) securitization of migrations in the old continent.

Biometric Technology for Migration Control

For those who have not followed the trend of using biometric data for more and more daily tasks and actions (unlocking the mobile phone, paying bills, crossing a border ...) we can define biometric data as personal data, whether physiological, physical or behavioral that make it possible to identify a person [11], being the principal means; fingerprinting [12], facial imaging [13], iris scanning [14], hand geometry recognition [15] and retina recognition [16].

But what a priori has been sold as the panacea for border control, improving conditions and aid for refugees, avoiding fraud, a machine for detecting criminals, and facilitating the lives of citizens in every day-to-day operation that requires identification. This system also faces multiple challenges and limitations in its use, especially in the context of forced migration.

With the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Western world changed its perception of migration and security, implementing all kinds of measures to prevent the entry of terrorists into its borders, becoming the technology of biometric data, one of the most important weapons, and fastest growing for refugee and migrant management and people control.

One of the most important implications of the use of this technology is the right to privacy of those who contribute their data to the system, being able to observe several points in this regard [17];

- **Functional creep**, biometric data are collected for a speci-

-fic use and are used for a very different one without the consent of the individual.

- **Clandestine tracking**, or the use by governments of biometric information to illegally monitor foreign migrants within the country.
- **Divulging further information**. By providing our biometric data, we may be providing information about our health, for example.
- **Access to Information**, when the legitimate recipients of the data share it with third parties, either in a consensual way (with governments or NGOs) or without consent (database hacking or technology theft).

Afghanistan is one of the most biometrically recognizable countries in the world, and there were three main sectors that have been amassing biometric data in the country for the last 20 years; ONG, s, Afghan government and US Army, and NATO.

The reasons why NGOs, s and donors of international aid "demand" an exhaustive control of the recipients of these aid and benefits, fits perfectly with the massive use of biometric data in Afghanistan. The search for control over refugees continually coming and going from Pakistan and Iran, and recipients of aid from the World Food Program, UNHCR or IOM (International Organization for Migration) have led this country to be vastly controlled in this regard, and amassing a gigantic database on Afghan citizens.

The Afghan Government, which has used biometric data to produce millions of national IDs in digital format, or also by comparing and exchanging data with NGOs, s at the Ministry for Refugees and Repatriation to facilitate the performance of its mission by officials.

And finally the military, especially the American army, but also other NATO soldiers, who with their small HIIDE device (Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment) the soldiers could take biometric data (fingerprints, iris scanner



and a photograph) to all Afghan citizens who had an interest in the mission, whether they were official or specific collaborators, as suspects and their families.

The fall into the hands of the Taliban of some databases and devices for collecting biometric data has revealed the inconveniences and limitations of the use of this technology in many cases, and in this case it may be being used as a source of information for the capture and the execution of former collaborators from the West, members of the government, or simply citizens who once took an interest in a job.

Refugees as a weapon of destabilization

The border between Poland and Belarus, a priori very far from the conflict in question, is being the protagonist of how the refugee crisis in Afghanistan is again affecting the migration policies of the European Union, and therefore, delving further if possible in the abysmal differences and interests that the Member States have on this issue. In this case, Poland and the European Union accuse Belarus of using and facilitating migrant flows against them to destabilize them. The EU claims to have evidence that President Aleksandr Lukashenko is allowing, and even inciting, migrants mainly from Afghanistan and Iraq to enter Belarus and then take them to the border with Lithuania and Poland to cross illegally, and all this in response to the sanctions that Europe imposed on Belarus for its violent response to the civil demonstrations that took place in the country, for the alleged government intervention in the result of the presidential elections.

The figures are crystal clear, since according to official Polish sources since last August there have been more than 16,000 attempts to enter the country illegally, which we compare with the 120 attempts that were made throughout the year 2020 [18]. This situation also collides with the strict anti-immigration regulations of the Polish conservative government of "o" migrants and "o" refugees in the country, which are not only being strictly enforced but also Poland has just passed a law by which it allows border guards, among ot-

-her things, to expel migrants who have entered Poland and also reject any application for asylum or refuge, even without prior examination [19]. The result of this humanitarian tragedy is 6 migrants killed at the moment, and it is feared that this number will increase in parallel with the drop in temperatures that the arrival of winter entails.

Securitization of Migration in Europe

After the political and social "cataclysm" caused by the migrant crisis in Europe of 2015 [20] when more than 1.3 million migrants entered the old continent irregularly, mainly through Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea, the reaction of Europe in general to the reception the number of new refugees from Afghanistan has been considerably reduced, practically limited for the moment only to the evacuation of Afghan personnel directly linked to the military and diplomatic operations of the European armies in the last 20 years.

In a Europe where more than 570,000 Afghans reside since 2015, already the largest group of refugees on the continent after Syrians, the aversion to refugees is obvious and palpable seeing how they have developed, regarding migration. The policies and events in the old continent since 2015; starting of course with the bilateral agreements of the EU with Turkey to prevent the passage of migrants to Europe and those of Spain and Morocco and Italy and Libya with the same objective; continuing with the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union; going through the clash of blocks with the member countries of the Visegrad Pact (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) and their strict and unsupportive policy of "o" refugees on their borders; the to say the least, dubious actions of FRONTEX with migrants trying to reach the Greek coasts from Turkey via the Mediterranean; or countries like Austria, Denmark, and Germany, which in the middle of the Taliban conflict deporting refugees to Afghanistan; the recent deaths on the border between Belarus and Poland where refugees crowd under cold temperatures awaiting a transfer from the Polish government.



For the moment, the European Union has focused on financially supporting Afghanistan's neighboring countries to contain this possible wave of Afghan refugees, although each state is studying its own way of acting in this regard.

Prospective


The collapse and subsequent civil war in Afghanistan would inevitably lead to a refugee crisis that, as we have seen in this document, would have negative consequences throughout the world, starting with a possible destabilization of neighboring countries such as Iran and Pakistan (nuclear power) and arriving of course to Europe, at a time where European citizens are showing a real aversion to refugees and economic migrants, and where there could be a greater push from far-right policies and the foundations of the European Union could return to endangered as a consequence (Polexit).

Countries like China and Russia are currently negotiating at the highest level with the Taliban, fearful, among other things, of a refugee crisis splashing over them and significantly affecting their security levels.



But the necessary economic aid to Afghanistan, to avoid the collapse of the country and subsequent refugee crisis, is being compromised by the distrust of the West with the current Taliban government, which, looking back, has already realized its behavior with respect to these aids because they did not reach the population. So the question is, how to help the Afghan people without enriching the Taliban? The worst thing is that it seems that this paradox is going to continue in the future.

Afghanistan is and will continue to be, for temporary and structural reasons, a country of origin of refugees and economic migrants, experiencing a very important humanitarian crisis and destabilizing its neighbors in the form of migratory pressure. If the West closes the door to refugees, it must propose a realistic refugee policy in the same geographical region, providing them with education, health, and services, so they can return home and be part of the reconstruction of their country in the future. This time we will not be able to look at Turkey.



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POLITIC

W W W . A L G H U R A B A . O R G

THE TALIBAN, RIVALS OR WINNERS

TERRORISTS OR RULERS, SECURITY AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES


Noor Dahri.

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Once again, the Taliban have conquered the entire Afghanistan with pride which has shocked the entire world especially the people of the capital, Kabul. The world is asking about the future of Afghanistan which is whether dark or bright, the future would tell us. Afghanistan is a land which has never been conquered by any power for a long time, they all left it with humiliation. Its not only the land strategic location in the region where it has borders with Iran, Pakistan, former Russian state and China. Every country has and remained geo political interests in the past in Afghanistan. The US war against terrorism has turned in the regional wars whether in Iraq or in Afghanistan which has ruined not only the image of the country but also damaged the US economy as well as lost trust on allies in the region.

Taliban came first in power in 1995 which were direct backed by the KSA, UAE and Pakistan and indirectly supported by the US and they were the same Taliban who were having successful meetings in Washington as well as giving lectures in the US universities but suddenly their futured has changed after the horrific incident of the 9/11 attacks when they refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US authorities. The Taliban had never attacked the US or western countries before 9/11, neither they carried out terrorist activities outside the Afghan borders after the collapse of their government in 2001.



Afghanistan is currently under Taliban control and is divided into three main areas, Southwestern Afghanistan is control by mainstream Taliban their main base in Kandahar, the Haqqani Network occupies Southeastern Afghanistan and non-Pashtun and Central Asian fighters groups in northern Afghanistan who has close relations with the Haqqani Network.

When the Taliban first appeared in Southern Afghanistan in the 1990s, southern leaders and commanders from the Greater Kandahar region had almost complete control over the first Taliban leadership and government. However, this tie, they face a major challenge from the Haqqani Network, whose stronghold is mainly in the Greater Paktia region in the east of the country. The Haqqanis and their foreign militant coalition groups now effectively control the eastern half of Afghanistan, including Kabul, leading to a major rift with the Taliban leadership in southern Afghanistan.

In addition to the current distribution of resources and power since the Taliban's recent victory, historical tribal conflicts appear to be working from within, turning the eastern Pashtuns (Ghilzais) against the southern Pashtuns (Durranis). Nevertheless, the southern Taliban retain control of the group's leadership which is said to be about half of the group's combined fighting force, estimated at 85,000 fighters.

There is no doubt that Taliban are the real winner and conquerors of Afghanistan, but the political power is like a fire which burns everyone and this is what has started now. There are many factions within the Taliban, these factions has influence from different powerful sates, for example, Russian Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Western Taliban and Iranian Taliban.

Mullah Ibrahim Sadr and Mullah Qayyum Zakir, two influential Taliban commanders from great Kandahar area, reportedly formed a separate faction after the key peace agreement was signed between the US and the Taliban in Feb 2020. These powerful leaders were affiliated with Iran and both were initially excluded from the Taliban government re-

-cently, but they later announced on Sep 21 that both would serve as deputy interior and defence ministers, respectively. Both are from Helmand province, where many Taliban fighters are from. There was a faction group in Taliban which broke away from the Taliban mainstream, was formed by Mullah Rassoul to oppose the succession of Akhtar Mansoor after the death of Taliban founder Mullah Omar. The group was later joined by the former Afghan government and was at war with the mainstream Taliban in Herat when its key military commander, Abdul Manan Niazi was assassinated last may by the Taliban.

There is another group which strongly apposed the Taliban talks and a peace agreement with the US government, was a small, hard-line group founded by Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah who was later killed in an airstrike in Helman in 2007. The group's combat capabilities are unknown, but they are expert in abduction and suicide bombings such as the abduction and subsequent assassination of New York Times reporter David Rohd, the assassination of award winning Swedish reporter Nils Horner, and some suicide bombings in India, this group, no doubt has linked to Pakistan's ISI (Intelligence Agency) just as Haqqani Network.

Taliban has many international, security and economic challenges in Afghanistan because terrorising the entire country is easier than the administrating it. Not a single country, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabis has yet accepted the Taliban government, which is a great political pressure on them. The economy of the country was totally dependent on international aid which was 85% in total, that is now stooped as well as a country's reserve accounts are also frozen in International banks which was financially devoted the whole country and people are suffering heavily. The IS-KP has carried out successful suicide attacks not only in Kabul but also in the mainstream Taliban leadership headquarter, Kandahar, which is also known as a spiritual city of the group and other cities of Afghanistan including the funeral prayer of the mother of Mullah Zabiullah Mujahid, spokesperson of the Taliban government.

IS-KP is a massive security challenge for the Taliban because IS-KP has not only dedicated suicide bombers but anti Taliban groups and factions has also joined the network against the Taliban. IS-KP has strong networks in entire Afghanistan, especially sleeping cells inside the Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan because the former Afghan government accommodated them in Kabul against the Taliban. The terrorist group is using the same suicide tactic which the Taliban had used in two decades against the coalition forces in Afghanistan, which is very hard to control and counter.

There is no doubt that Taliban has more pressure from inside and outside Afghanistan then they had in the first term in 1995 because at that time they had no major rivals in the world than now, and they have also promised the world that they are not same Taliban and that they have changed entirely but in reality they have so far failed to act on those promises such as human rights violations are somehow still there, women rights are still absence, the promise of the unity government is still missing in the current cabinet. The Haqqani Network has recently hosted a ceremony where they honoured the families of suicide bombers with gifts and money and declared those suicide terrorists as their heroes, without their sacrifices, the current victory cannot be achieved, Haqqani network leaders said in the media.

The current reality is that the Taliban are the fact and they are the rulers of Afghanistan and the entire world has to accept the bitter truth and should force them to collaborate to the world according to the Doha agreement for the sake and better future of the country as well as people.



WHY WAS THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN LOST?

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Understanding the War in Afghanistan involves discovering a tendency which wants to mask the truth. It is true that al-Qaeda committed the 9/11 attacks, It is true that the attack was carried out by Saudi or Egyptian terrorists, where there was no Afghan, but more certain is that al-Qaeda, from its earliest age, was already embedded in the Afghan terrain.

The Taliban al-Qaeda tandem was a reality despite the differences between the two groups, while the Taliban were ruled by an extreme hanafi-style sharia seasoned by the Afghan Pashtunwali, al-Qaeda had international will, it was a

network that tried to fight against "Jews and Crusaders" (referring to Israel and the western military presence in the Arab world) and, also, against the rulers of Muslim countries that did not apply Sharia law, for which they would be classified as "munafik" (hypocrites).

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were the essential allies: they provided money and ideology to the fighters against the USSR and to the government of Islamabad and its Secret Service in the western region of Pakistan, the ISI (Inter-Secret Intelligence). The Afghan experience with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network or Hezbi Islami and Hezbi Islami Golb-



-undin gave to Pakistan an action template to approach the Kashmir issue through Lashkar e Taiba, but this is another story.

Geopolitically Pakistan is a double state: on the one hand the structure of the country and on the other its Secret Service. The ISI has only one agenda: the interests of Pakistan, and that means playing double and triple games, talking to each other. Pakistan needed a weak Afghanistan after the controversies with the Shah Mohamed Zahir Sha or with Mohamed Daud Khan, the latter especially virulent with his irredentist interests at the expense of the western territory of Pakistan, Pashtunistan, territory divided by the Durrant line in the 19th century and that the Afghans did not accept yet.

A strong Afghanistan whether under the Empire of the Shah of Afghanistan, the nationalist republican government of Daud, or the communists of the Saur revolution was a direct threat to its territorial integrity and threatened Islamabad with a "Finlandization" of its foreign geopolitics, especially if there was an eventual and disastrous alliance between Kabul and New Delhi, which would be catastrophic. Without the fact that a radically communist Afghanistan within the Soviet Marxist theses placed the USSR on its western border and Maoist China on its northern border ... except on the chronic conflict on its eastern border with India.

Pakistan needed to be part of that contest in Afghanistan. The Pakistani objective on its western territory would be to recruit, ideologize and train all the volunteers who wanted to join the Jihad. The network of mosques and madrasas would provide the logistics, and the tribal regions would also provide the shrines. Afghanistan would not be a threat to Pakistan, in fact Islamabad's influence would be decisive.

Saudi Arabia was fearful of the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and needed to shore up its Wahhabist ideology, so it launched itself to help Pakistanis at the event. The USA government would put the weapons and the money, the CIA the objectives to be achieved and its allies, the methods to carry out the war. The first objective would be to destroy any moderate group that existed in the anti-communist resistance movement: monarchists and nationalists would be purged. The most radical and tribal factions remained.

In 2001, Afghanistan became the center of the world after the war against the USA. This war should be analyzed more than a fight as a punitive expedition that, however (as almost always happens in these expeditions that have more adventurers than wars), lengthened in time. USA did not lose the war, they won it: they defeated the Talibans, they fled, but they did not know how to leave the game board fast enough to avoid the scenes we saw in October. USA lost the postwar period. They created an Afghan puppet government whose objective was based on controlling cities. The initiative was not from Afghan army but from Talibans, who knew and controlled the land, being the USA army presence the only one that stopped a total offensive. As the Afghan army proved unmotivated and unwilling to fight, the only reason for wearing the uniform was the salary paid by the USA or royalties from widespread corruption and political inefficiency, which became a filter that they were dedicated to enriching their selves with the economic AID that Washington sent to Kabul and that ended up in the coffers of the leaders, chiefs, and warlords of the day.

The lack of a state caused the Afghan national currency would be less than wallpaper. Due to this situation, the economic crisis worsened, and common crime appeared, which was poorly fought by security forces more focused on defending their fortified positions than in defending their own state.



Faced with this, the Taliban and their Islamic tax system (curiously the Taliban do not tolerate corruption) demand the Islamic tax that when another tax collector arrives, is shown by what the Taliban "official" does not. To Collect that tax again and, at the same time, the effectiveness fighting of the crime and the fast and effective judicial model without the constraints of a Western but absolutely corrupt and inefficient judicial system, made the population of the cities will start supporting the Taliban.

In fact, it was the role of the petty bourgeoisie and tribal-linked Afghan economic powers that made it possible for what was envisioned as a new civil war to end in an offensive that took the country in two weeks. Not to mention that the Pashtuns, during the era of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, were purged of many state institutions by the government and the United States in favor of the Tajiks, an Iranian ethnic group related to the Pashtuns but opposed to them.

This loss of power was what led Ahmad Massoud, son of Ahmad Sha Massoud, to create with Yar Dostum (son of Abdul Rachid Dostum) the Afghan National Resistance Front militia in the Panjshir but that, unlike his father, he couldn't maintain it and lost it in late August and early September at the hands of the Taliban with Pakistani help.

Curiously, Massoud's model for Afghanistan is similar to the Swiss model, where there is a kind of Afghan confederation in which each tribal area has broad autonomy, which clashes head-on with the unitary Afghan model proposed by the Taliban. A model where they subject the tribes to through the Ministry of Tribal Affairs to the Kabul authority.

In fact, the great danger of the Emirate of Afghanistan does not come from Massoud's resistance but from ISIS-K, a branch of the Islamic State that wants to overthrow the Taliban whom they accuse of having softened and neglected the sharia at certain points, The objective is to confront the Afghan communities, hence the campaign of attacks against



Shiite mosques in the country. The Shiites, who were close enemies of the Taliban, in this second caliphate seem not to have such a complicated future due to the interest of the new Kabul government to truly govern a stable state and have the most stable and normal international relationships and, for them, their model is based on countries like Saudi Arabia or Iran, countries that applies Sharia but are stable members of the International Community.

However, the question is there. Afghanistan now faces a new stage, this time the Emirate's wishes make them have stable relations with countries such as China or Russia. Beijing, however, has reinforced its borders with Afghanistan and Russia reinforced its military bases in Tajikistan and protects the Dushan government. , the government is more reluctant to the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan due to the memory of the war in the nineties.

Between Afghanistan and Pakistan, despite good relations, there have already been certain tensions, especially over the Spin Boldak-Chaman border crossing in which both parties accuse each other of a lack of interest in addressing the challenges necessary for a normal neighborhood relationship. Meanwhile the United States sees how its credibility has disappeared, the images of Kabul are more damaging to the government of Washington than the evacuation of Saigon in the seventies while it sees how countries like Russia or China establish alliances with Afghanistan, China needs to reinforce its presence in Central Asia and needs a direct link with Iran, a country that has good relations with Kabul but what Beijing seeks is to strengthen Gwadar. India needs a market in Afghanistan to place its products, in fact, the route already exists: Chabahar, the Iranian port from where India exports wheat to Afghanistan. In fact the port is an important business center for Kabul.

Faced with this, the United States has seen how the money it has spent in Afghanistan has been of no use, faced with the poor infrastructure, which is already negotiating its maintenance, creation and reforms with Chinese construction companies, Washington strategists have seen as one of the

Abandoned powder magazines in Afghanistan, the Taliban have sold material to Iran, China, and Russia... we are talking about military technology: as some abandoned but unused helicopters, armored vehicles, weapons, etc. which could be reverse engineered causing great damage to the Pentagon.

Not to mention the capture of all the military material abandoned on the Friendship Bridge between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and that the government of Tashkent has already incorporated into its army.

In short, the United States has lost the postwar period in an unpopular conflict that has made it spend billions of dollars for nothing, the lives of soldiers and has destroyed a country that has the will to rise up in the form of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan against the noses of a United States that never believed in the Afghan mission, neither politically nor American society, an expensive, unpopular war that gave more headaches than solutions.

Now everyone in Washington, Kabul, and many other cities sleep peacefully. Although those who sleep best are the leaders of the extinct Islamic Republic of Afghanistan such as Abdul Rachid Dostum or Ashraf Ghani who fled in a hurry but with their saddlebags well loaded with dollars, which were sent from Washington, and never reached the Afghan people and that is why In just two weeks, the Taliban went from rugged mountain sanctuaries to sitting in the presidential chair.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN

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The fall of Kabul and the seizure of power by the Taliban has reordered the regional scheme of Central Asia and the expanded Middle East. We cannot say that it was a surprise in military terms, let us remember that the withdrawal of foreign troops was the core of the Doha Agreements of January 2020, what has been a surprise have been some logistical errors that generated the chaos of the last days of August, that is, the deployment, and the speed with which the Afghan state troops have virtually disintegrated in the face of the advance of the Taliban insurgency.

Thus, we now find in Afghanistan a state with multiple overlapping crises: a government not yet recognized by the international community, a Taliban group within which diffe-

-rences are emerging between the different factions that make it up, a humanitarian crisis that will worsen in the future following weeks and the instability resulting from the emergence of ISIS Khorasan, as a group facing the Taliban.

All these crises have the potential to become regional crises, hence what happens in Afghanistan does not remain in Afghanistan and the consequent concern of the governments of the region, starting with the bordering ones, but without neglecting other non-bordering states, but with interest, should be considered.

In the following pages I will focus particularly on Iran, a neighbor that shares a common border of 920 kilometers with



Afghanistan in a region that on both sides of the international boundary has specific problems and challenges.

From the Iranian side, we find three provinces: Khorasan Razavi, South Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan. There, in recent decades, the Iranian authorities have had to deal with Baloch insurgent movements that have generated serious inconvenience, the same as in Pakistan. From the Afghan side, the southwestern provinces of the country: Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar are precisely where the production of opiates is concentrated with the consequent problems generated by the trafficking of these substances. Thus, the Iranian-Afghan border suffers from problems that we could call structural, beyond the differences between the system of the Islamic Republic and the Taliban movement.

Between 1996 and 2001, when the Taliban were in power, relations between Tehran and Kabul were very tense. First, from an ideological point of view, the Salafism-jihadism of the Taliban saw the Iranian Shiites as a fundamental enemy. From a political point of view, Tehran's support for the Northern Alliance, particularly Tajiks and Hazaras, made threats and tensions almost the rule during that five-decade Taliban power in Afghanistan. The murder of nearly a dozen Iranian diplomats at the Mazar-e-Sharif consulate in 1998 brought the countries almost to the brink of war.

It is often forgotten that after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and until January 2002, when in his State of the Union address, then-US President George W. Bush included Iran in the "Axis of Evil", the Cooperation against the common enemy brought Washington and Tehran closer in those months.

That oppositional relationship of the 1990s between Iran and Afghanistan today has new characteristics. For Tehran, you might think, the withdrawal of foreign troops, particularly American ones, from Afghanistan is good news, but it is possible that the internal criticism that the Biden administration will face, in an election year in the United States, will harden its position in the nuclear negotiation. Therefore, it is a fleeting joy.

On the other hand, some 750,000 Afghans already live in Iran who have fled instability and violence in their country since the 1980s, although that number may be much higher. From Iran, in the midst of a serious economic, social and political crisis, the last thing it wants is a new flow of externally displaced persons trying to enter the country and generating a humanitarian crisis. Hence, Iranian decision-makers are willing to forget the past and start a new chapter of relations, where an agenda can be established based on common interests rather than on confrontations or compensation for past affronts.

But Iranian interests go far beyond stability and humanitarian considerations. In the economic sphere, Iranian-Afghan relations have expanded considerably in the last two decades. In western Afghanistan, the city of Herat, where Dari is the most common language, which is the same as Persian spoken in Iran, has become a commercial hub for Iranian companies. An estimated 40% of Afghan imports come from Iran, and that's a position the Tehran government is unwilling to abandon amid sanctions and closed markets for its products.

The port of Chabahar, expanded and modernized with Indian capital, has become a clear competition for the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi. So much so that it has even been kept out of the international sanctions scheme imposed by the United States after its exit from the nuclear agreement in May 2018. Chabahar is the great Iranian bet to offset the Sino-Pakistani axis of the other two ports, something the United States knows very well. The paradox, from Washington, is that competing with China for the region's ports, involves supporting Iran!

Economic and logistical links, therefore, constitute a nucleus whose maintenance is in the interest of Iran and Afghanistan. Security issues do not disappear, of course, but they share an agenda with these issues that are essential for two states that must face situations of economic crisis and isolation from the international community.

The Helmand River, which rises in Afghanistan and then enters Iran, is the main source of water resources for the eastern provinces of Iran. Hence, water management is another issue where we see a shared interest between both states.

This centrality of economic issues does not imply that Iranian decision-makers are unaware of the challenges in the field of security. Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, who took the post after Qasem Soleimani's assassination, has spent a good part of his career in the Iranian provinces bordering Afghanistan. He is not the only one, and he is a good example that when Afghan issues have to be discussed, they are seen from different perspectives: the bazaars see the economic interests, the Pasdaran, the security interests.

As can be seen, pragmatism is an element that should not be discarded when analyzing regional relations. Not everything should be seen in absolute categories such as belonging to one or another branch of Islam, or ideologies such as the government of the Iranian sages or Salafism jihadism complemented by the Pashtun code of the Taliban. On the contrary, material interests play a central role rather than static and one-dimensional visions based on simplistic friend-foe criteria. Nothing is that simple.

There are multiple connections, actors, interests, issues, which together give us a complex image but much more realistic than those simplified versions of the relationships between states. The case of Iran and Afghanistan is a clear example. But the same can be said for almost every country in the region. The more details, the more complexity and the more complexity, the closer to reality.

Stereotypical visions are simpler, but they are not good elements that allow us to understand a situation, much less generate forecasts about it.



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A woman wearing a black niqab is partially visible on the left side of the image. The background is a solid light gray. A large, faint, circular watermark logo is centered in the background. The logo consists of a stylized 'A' and 'G' intertwined within a circle.

WOMEN

W W W . A L G H U R A B A . O R G

WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN PREPARED TO DIE

Marta González Isidoro.

Journalist and Political Analyst. Middle East specialist.



The 15th of August 2021, many televisions and social networks around the world were flooded with images of the fall of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and the triumphal entry of the Taliban, twenty years after the regime of terror that these fundamentalists imposed between 1996 and 2001. We still have recent images that put Afghanistan in the media focus with the apparently hasty departure of the US troops. Afghanistan is a predominantly rural country of just over 39 million people, lost on the southern flank of Central Asia. In consequence, the chaos that resulted from the evacuation of the collaborators of the international forces (translators and interpreters) and their families, of the civilians, trying to flee, of the collapse of the airport of Kabul,

the offensive in the Panshir Valley against the new Northern Alliance or the protests of the population, especially women, in cities such as Herat or Jalalabad against the Taliban presence.

The collapse of the government, the flight of its president, Ashraf Ghani and the speed with which the national army was disintegrating caught most of the international community by surprise, although not the specialists and analysts who follow the evolution of events throughout the Middle East and that we view with skepticism the approach of vertically creating stable states, with a certain appearance of law and order, in heterogeneous societies, based on customs and norms that contradict the codes by which we operate in societies Western



countries and/or the most elementary rules of human rights, and also lack state institutions, either because they are failed states, incapable of ensuring the well-being of their inhabitants even though their borders are internationally recognized, or because legitimacy rests with the leaders tribals of the numerous ethnic groups that make up the country, guarantors of managing the internal affairs that experience in their respective communities - through the application of their own codes, arising from their particular sense of ethics and honor - and almost always in opposition to the traditional concept of citizenship and cohesive national identity.

The image and the story that accompanies the power of these images is a key element in determining what may happen in the nearest future. The events we saw conveyed to us the idea that wars end the moment the Americans stop waging them, that is, the moment the United States ceases to be a reliable partner for its allies and instead becomes harmless to his enemies. The message is very powerful, because it transmits to the jihadist Islamic world the idea that the exit is due to a weakness, a fear and a defeat that must be exploited. Therefore, for the jihadist discourse, these images and the geopolitical consequences reinforce the narrative about the decline of the West and the waning relevance of the liberal systems of Western governments.

Although the world has always been unstable and the future uncertain. We cannot ignore that the physical environments in which individuals, societies and countries develop condition the way in which they perceive reality. As Tim Marshall wrote (*Prisoners of geography*, Peninsula, 2017), geography determines the way in which a nation is or can become, and its vulnerabilities and strengths are used by political leaders who in the end, with more or less successful, are those who make the decisions that explain the events, conflicts, crises or internal and international tensions. Afghanistan is one of those paradigmatic cases where geography more clearly determines the character of its inhabitants. Always subject to instability and foreign invasions, ethnolinguistic and tribal conflict, added to the

strength they find in religion and the need for survival, they have forged an anachronistic society, impervious to attempts at Westernization and on the fringes of the economic and financial circuits of the contemporary globalized world. An involuntary buffer between India and Pakistan, it is also in a convulsed area, in the middle of a geopolitical game that we cannot ignore either. And despite the reconstruction effort and the achievements of recent years in trying to reduce the high rates of infant mortality, raise the literacy rate or improve per capita income, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The economy in Afghanistan is very weak and heavily dependent on foreign aid despite having strategic mineral deposits - iron, copper, gold, rare earths, or lithium, essential for the technology industry -, including wood and opium. Afghanistan tried to create a nation-state has proven to be an entelechy, but this that collided with the reality of an ineffective and deeply corrupt Administration.

The history of Afghanistan is ancient, although its current borders were defined in 1896 after an agreement reached between Afghans, English and Russians and recognized in 1919. We are not going to delve into the realities that show a really complex panorama. We have to say that exists a desire to a minority urban elite for liberalizing the country at different intervals of the 20th century clashes. But they have found a strong opposition of the most radical political and religious sectors. Although, if we want to understand the extreme violence of the current moment we must place, as a turning point, the internal conflict, civil in nature, which explodes for the control of power and the nation after the departure of the Soviets in 1989. Let us remember that the country became a refuge for al-Qaeda, and that after the attacks in 11st September 2001, and the American invasion, events are rushing. The fall of the Taliban regime seemed to open the door to a new, more open, and stable country, especially for women. That optimism led him to affirm to US President Barack Obama in 2011 that al-Qaeda had been defeated and that the Taliban would never regain control of Afghanistan. But La Paz was still a distant horizon for a population accustomed to war and extreme violence, and

a decade later, the country goes back twenty-five years in Time, in which music, games, photography or laughter were forbidden. The difference is that we now have a conservative movement adapted to the digital reality of the 21st Century that has the North American military arsenal and the support of new regional actors, some with nuclear capabilities. The women in Afghanistan, faced with the implantation of an Islamic Emirate yet to be defined, anticipate modifying their habits and covering their bodies as a precaution with the traditional burqa, aware that, if they want to survive, they have to be prepared to die.

Being a woman is not easy outside the comfort of the borders of the West. To broaden the view and understand the context of the social, legal, and cultural reality in which women in Afghanistan live, it is necessary to know the roots of this entrenched conflict. In a single generation, the country has gone from monarchy to unaccepted formal democracy, to revolution and communism, to civil war, to religious fundamentalism of the Mujahideen and the Taliban, and to the latest trial of a democracy granted and vertical that has allowed to recover a certain appearance of normality while fighting the counterinsurgency. Because the critics that we have seen in social networks of the abandonment of the West by politicians, journalists, university students, human rights activists, businesswomen, or artists and representatives of other qualified sectors, do not cease to be feats that go beyond the survival of a small group of women who see their lives unravel. As we know, afghan society is so traditional. We can see the heartbreaking testimony of the filmmaker Saharaa Karimi. Karimi is a refugee in Ukraine. She recorder with a mobile phone her flight from Kabul after the control of the city by the Taliban. In Afghanistan the women do not show his face in public and getting on stage, working as a model, or hosting a television program is taboo, it was nothing more than an attempt to remember that the most rigorous interpretation of Islamic law and the excuse of Sharia as a license to kill it returned to be institutionalized again and return women to the ostracism and invisibility of yesteryear, depriving them of the little political, economic and social advances experienced in the last fifteen years.





Although, the weight of tradition continues to be important, especially in rural areas. The Constitution of 2004 represented a small advance, at least from a legal perspective, by returning to women certain rights that returned them to the public space with relative guarantees of Security. Being able to study, be visible in the public space, dress with relative freedom, or practice medicine, despite the fact that a Code of Conduct agreed with the ulama was in force in 2012, has helped to reduce the pressure and control that patriarchal families exert over them. In this way, women have been able to play an important role in the reconstruction of the country with the help of the International Community, and are present in all social spheres - including Parliament - despite the unrest atmosphere that prevails in the Society negatively affects the most open-minded sectors and especially women who work outside the home. The polygamy, forced marriages, child marriage, paying the price for a bride, domestic violence, honor killings or public corporal punishment for challenging their interpretation of the Qur'an are ingrained and accepted customs. Facing incomprehensible cultural traditions in a globalized world and prejudices that are difficult to eradicate shows the weakness of the authorities and the difficulty in building a new cultural framework for a society resistant to any modernization process and that lives practically anchored in the Middle Ages.

In conclusion, the women in Afghanistan live in a situation of helplessness, like a consequence of the application of very strict codes based on tradition, culture, and a rigorous religious interpretation that intensify with the particular circumstances of a country in conflict. The present is uncertain and the future foreseeable. The Taliban have been financing themselves through drug trafficking, extortion, and illegal mining, and it does not seem that this is going to change despite the image laundering and international legitimacy they seek and need. Ideologically they are the same, although their strategy has been adapted to the new regional and international circumstances. The SARS-COVID 19 pandemic reduced the government's ability, greatly weakened due to lack of legitimacy, to generate domestic income. The country, as we know, has a heavy dependence on international assistance was added to an acute food crisis driven by population displacements after the Taliban advance from January (more than 400,000, most of them women with children). Also, the prolonged drought effects, according to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Crescent, approximately 12.2 million Afghans (a third of the estimated population)



. And almost half of children under five years of age will suffer from acute malnutrition in 2021. It is a bleak future if one takes into account that the associated cultural stigmas will expel half of the population from educational and health care just for the fact that to be a woman. The International Community has thrown in the towel with a rebellious country that could well be the development pole of Central Asia if the security necessary to attract investments and transactions from the countries of the region were guaranteed. There is already a generation of young people who were born in relative stability and could be the engine of change without giving up their cultural essence. It is possible that the Afghan people are tired of being told how they should live, but the implantation of such a rigorous Islamic Emirate in the middle of the 21st Century is an anomaly that surpasses any attempt to understand a rich culture that, imprisoned by its geography, decided live in hiding and turn your back on progress understood as the right that every human being has to respect and integrity.

Restrictions and punishments

Restrictions on public roads: During the Taliban regime, women were practically invisible in public spaces:

- They were forbidden to speak or shake hands with men with whom they were not related.
- They couldn't laugh in public because no stranger should hear their voice.
- They could not look out of the windows or the balconies of any building, even their own homes, and they had to have opaque windows to avoid being seen from the outside.
- They could not be present in any media or in public meetings of any kind.
- They could not play sports or attend any sporting event as spectators.

- They were prohibited from meeting for any recreational or festive purpose, going to the movies, using public toilets, washing in rivers or public squares.
- No one could photograph or film women and it was strictly forbidden to publish images of women in printed media such as billboards, magazines or books. Pictures of women were not allowed to be hung in houses or shops.
- No street, square or avenue could bear the name of a woman. The Women's Garden in Kabul was renamed the Spring Garden.

Mobility restrictions: Women were forbidden from leaving the house to carry out any activity as long as they were not accompanied by a closely related man, that is, their guardian or marham – father, brother, husband –. This included that they could not get into a taxi alone, into a bus that was not exclusively for women or ride a bicycle or motorbike. Those who violated the rule of being accompanied by a man were subjected to corporal punishment, such as spanking, beatings, and verbal abuse.

Dress restrictions: Although the burqa has existed in Afghanistan since before the Taliban regime, it was not a mandatory garment, although its use was widespread in rural areas. But it was this rigorous group that implemented its mandatory use by forbidding women to show any part of their body in public, including their faces. The women had to cover their entire body, from head to toe, they could not show ankles or any part of the body, and they were whipped and condemned as guilty if they were raped for showing too much. The limitations included the clothes the women wore. They were forbidden to wear brightly colored clothes because the Taliban considered them heretical and sexually attractive. They were also unable to wear flared pants or high heels because they produced noise when walking. Tailors couldn't measure women. They were also unable to wear makeup or have their nails painted. In fact, during the reign of terror, cases of finger amputations were reported to women who had painted nails.

Economic restrictions: Until 1996, 25% of Afghanistan's workforce was made up of women, but the Taliban showed their opposition to mixed workplaces. On September 30, the Taliban regime decreed the prohibition of work for women, which should be limited to work at home. Only a small number of women were allowed to assist doctors and nurses in Kabul hospitals under strict control and surveillance. All the Infant and Primary teachers also disappeared and were banned from closing deals with male merchants.

Restrictions on access to health: Medical care was also precarious for women since they could not be cared for by male health workers and there were few female doctors and nurses with permission to practice. The rate of women who died in Afghanistan due to lack of assistance in pregnancy, according to CNN in 2001, was the second in the world - 16 out of 100 died in childbirth -

Restrictions on access to education: Although the school enrollment rate for girls has always been very low, under the Taliban regime education was banned for women over eight years old. Access to Universities or Educational Institutions was forbidden. The strong restrictions came to sexuality. Thus, women accused of having sex outside of marriage would be sentenced to death by stoning.



© Fragmento de Mother, Daughter, Doll (vía Instagram/Boushra Almutawakel)

DESCIFRANDO LA MENTE DEL YIHADISTA

ya disponible

EN AMAZON

Islam

Martirio

Ingimasi

Yihad

Daes
Al Ibtla

Tagut

Takfir

Al Hakim

BAHAE EDDINE BOUMNINA



INTERVIEW

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SHUKRIA BARAKZAI

POLÍTICA AFGANA, PERIODISTA Y FEMINISTA

Entrevista de David Garriga



Shukria Barakzai, was born in Kabul, Afghanistan 1970. She is an Afghan politician, journalist and feminist. She is the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Norway. She was awarded the International Editor of the Year Award. She is a former Afghan MP who faced death threats because of her views in favor of women's equality.

She founded Kabul's national women's weekly Aina-E-Zan (Women's Mirror) in 2002. She contributed to the writing of the Constitution of Afghanistan and is the 2004 international director of Worldpress.org (an American virtual magazine that publishes articles from the international press).

Among progressive Afghan women, she has also had experience negotiating with the Taliban as part of the delegation led by Afghan women that met with the insurgent group in Oslo in the summer of 2015. This was an unprecedented event, as the Taliban previously refused to meet prominent female personalities.



1 - What is expected of the peace process between Afghans and Taliban? Do you think that Terrorism has a place in this new government?

There has been a lot of hope for the peace process and peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government since 2018-August 2021. Unfortunately, this political process, despite having widespread global support - it was ineffective due to the lack of seriousness in the negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. The Taliban avoided reducing violence, and a lasting ceasefire did not work. Yet the Afghan government released more than 5,000 Taliban prisoners as a precondition for talks to begin.

There were multiple reasons for its failure, such as: political divisions, the lack of a strong negotiating team on the part of the Afghan government, poor leadership of the selfish and inexperienced politicians, and incomplete analysis of the situation in Afghanistan along with US over-involving the Taliban created the recipe for its predictable failure.

With regards to political power- the signing of the Doha Agreement gave the Taliban legitimacy and diplomatic and political credibility. This is a golden opportunity for the Taliban to gain the trust of the United States and other Western countries in exchange for not attacking US forces and allied forces in Afghanistan. As a result of this fake political settlement under the name of a peace process - former President Ashraf Ghani went into exile and a Taliban invasion took place. After 20 years of struggle, more than 125,600 Afghans (both civilian and military) were killed and more than \$2 trillion was spent for replacing the Taliban with Taliban. In other words, those on sanctions list who are wanted by US intelligence agencies should rule over the Afghan people using US manufactured guns and weapons.

2- What has failed during these 20 years of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, making it seem that when they leave, everything will go back to the way it was before?

Unlike what the Taliban believe- I believe that nothing was the same in Afghanistan as it was 20 years ago. After 9/11, Afghanistan was isolated, deserted. It was in complete political, economic, cultural and social isolation. That Afghanistan which had more educated men and women - more than six million of them flee to neighboring countries of Tajikistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan and other European countries. My country was like a soulless body. But today we are talking about an Afghanistan where the civil resistance and values of its men and women are stronger than before. They want to protect civil rights (especially the right of girls getting an education), the right to work for women, and the freedom of expression. These are what the Afghan people want, despite the Taliban's stubbornness. Afghanistan now after 20 years is a young and informed generation that is connected with the world.

These foreign countries did not have a clue about Afghanistan's intellectual and ethnic infrastructure. They also did not have shared goals and visions. Their military missions led to the killing of civilians. Their support of corrupt warlords and inexperienced and infiltrated technocrats provided the best opportunity for breeding terrorism. Afghanistan should be free from the intervention of the great powers of the world.

Whether we like it or not the people of Afghanistan have been victims of big politics since the Cold War. In addition, the geography of Afghanistan has been a laboratory for colonization and the use of modern weapons, and a field for military exercises for both the eastern and western blocs.



3- There is a change in the situation of women before and after the withdrawal from the United States. Now what awaits them?

Undoubtedly, the situation of Afghan women is directly related to the political, economic, and social situation of the country. Women and children have been victims of war and domestic violence for many years, and are now victims of the Taliban's misogynistic policies. Without being counted as citizens and human beings of the country - they are ruthlessly deprived of their human rights with each passing day. They look at a future full of challenges in a situation of economic misery, disease, and unemployment.

We women, who overcame the high peaks of political, social, and economic participation and presence with thousands of difficulties and sacrifices in the last twenty years, must now fight again for equal human rights. Ignoring the status of women in Afghanistan is as bad as legitimizing oppressive terrorist groups. Heroic Afghans women and girls fight injustice with all their might- they will not allow themselves to be victims of discrimination again.

4- What do you think of the publicity that some western media have done to soften Taliban radicalism?

Judge the truth of the Taliban's thinking by their actions. Undoubtedly, the official policy of many Western countries was to support the Taliban, especially after the Doha Agreement on February 29, 2020. Part of the Western media portrayed the situation in the Taliban's favor. But journalists who believe in the principles and ethics of journalism (after the fall of Kabul) - they desperately wanted to remove the mask from the Taliban. But sadly now it was too late. The painful story of the Afghan people, the true stories of their lives, touched the hearts of kind and emotional people. But the Taliban's thinking and ugly actions owed nothing to these stories. No significant positive changes were seen in their strict policies.

5- As a member of parliament at a decisive moment for the country, what do you think awaits us in the short-medium term in Afghanistan?

There are three possibilities. Of course, each of these possibilities has depends on a comprehensive decision that to what extent the interests of Afghanistan's neighbours and foreign power will align.



First, the establishment of a government with a broad gender, ethnic, religious, and political rule in Afghanistan. Of course, this will be with moderate and reformist policies based on the requirements of the twenty-first century. In the short term this will provide the people with elections and political participation with rights and duties. With the support of the international community, especially the Western bloc and the United Nations.

Second, the possibility of the Taliban regime continuing with slightly softer policies with a positive change in the structure of if body - in terms of intellectual, sexual, religious, ethnic and political diversity. Creating a system based on mullahs, the process of which only religious groups and their military members have political and administrative power Afghanistan, which will be supported mostly by countries such as Pakistan and China and a limited number of Islamic countries.

Third, the continuation of what is a highly backward, extremist religious system, weakly mired in poverty and civil war between various groups, including the Khorasan branch of ISIL. Unfortunately, Afghanistan will become a safe haven for more than twenty-two terrorist groups in the world. And the world is in danger.

6- What do you think has been the trigger for social disenchantment towards an administration that did not guarantee a secure?

Whenever the target of the current Taliban regime is for the time being - the system of government is completely incomplete. From the structure to the performance of even the leader who has not yet addressed the people as his main and direct audience.

Meanwhile, no Taliban official is held accountable for what they are doing. The difficult economic situation and extreme poverty among the people, along with the systematic discrimination by the Taliban. The extreme unemployment, the severance of Afghanistan from the world, and the lack of services provided by the Taliban and their strict social laws leave no guarantee of trust. Although reducing suicide bombings and corruption is one of the things the Taliban have overcome, it has failed to build trust.




7- Do you think that Afghanistan, under the Taliban Government, will be an abomination Theocracy or does it have an expiration?

Religious extremism in human history has made governments failed and hated. Look at its intellectual geography in European history. The answer is clear. The same fate will befall the Taliban government.



Humillación y agonía

Juan E. Soto
David Garriga



Este interesante libro profundiza en el Análisis Conductual de los vídeos que en los últimos años DAESH ha hecho públicos y en los que se muestran algunas ejecuciones de sus rehenes



ANNIVERSARY MAGAZINE

W W W . A L G H U R A B A . O R G



CISEG

ISSUES 50

David Garriga & Ariadna Trespaderne.

President and General Secretary of CISEG.



"Success is the sum of small efforts
repeated day after day"

Robert Collier

We are in celebration. With this new issue, the Intelligence and Global Security Community reaches its 50th publication of Al-Ghuraba Magazine. When we were born in 2017, one of our objectives was to create an accessible, free and constant tool for professionals related to the terrorism sector, but also for the civilian population. Our project was born with the hope of positioning ourselves as a magazine of alternative narratives and useful knowledge to prevent violent radicalization. While we started this project by focusing on terrorist organizations of jihadist etiology, thanks to the success achieved we were able to extend the analysis to other forms of radicalization powerfully current.

On the one hand, the objective was to provide knowledge



ANNIVERSARY MAGAZINE

to the general population from different professional perspectives and specializations, so that communities could empower themselves and understand what violent radicalization is, how it manifests and what the current situation is, since there is no greater weapon than a society formed and informed.

On the other hand, we also wanted to reach the most vulnerable sectors, people who might suffer a possible radicalization or who knew someone close to them in that situation, and who through easy, understandable, and free articles would know the reality of the phenomenon, thus making it possible to erode and delegitimize those narratives that terrorist organizations offer.

Finally, we are aware that it has also served as a channel for monthly information in the academic and practical sectors of security, intelligence, criminology, and other areas that have direct contact with the problem.

Although the beginnings were not easy, our illusion allowed us to move forward. They helped to reinforce the team's desire and confidence as the project worked and received very positive feedbacks on the work done by international supporters and collaborators who facilitated our magazine to be a reference magazine in alternative narratives and prevention of radicalism in Spanish.

During these five years, hundreds of experts have written for Al-Ghurabá who selflessly have their knowledge with the sole aim of bringing knowledge closer to society. In addition, we have had the good fortune to interview 50 experts who have contributed their knowledge and impressions on prevention, bringing together their projects and experiences. Each one of them, from their specialty, have allowed us to reflect and know that the world of safety and prevention is multifactorial and can be addressed from different spaces and professions.

We cannot finish this podium without thanking all the people who have made it possible for this to go ahead, the ex-

-perts who have contributed by bringing together a topic that is often hidden in the academic or operational field. A thousand thanks to those more than 400,000 faithful readers, who every month are there, reading to us. We also thank the different European projects that have given us visibility at international level, and the more than 50 associations and agreed companies that support and encourage us to follow every day. Thanks to all those who publicly or privately send us suggestions and criticisms to improve. Now, we are where we are after 5 years thanks to you.

By definition, Denis Waitley said, the results you get are directly proportional to the effort you apply. Those who subscribe can no longer agree; this rostrum is a special thanks to all the people who for their dedication, self-discipline, and effort have made Al-Ghuraba a reality. And logically also to you, reader, for accompanying you on this path and wanting to continue learning. Reading opens a window to the outside world.

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